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Wrongful conviction is a serious dilemma for thecriminal-justice system. A joint investigation by theBetter Government Association and the Center on
Wrongful Convictions tracked exonerations from 1989
through 2010 and identified 85 people who were wrongfully
incarcerated.1 Not only were those 85 lives unfairly affected in
serious ways due to the incarceration, but the actual perpetra-
tors continued on crime sprees that went on to include 14
murders, 11 sexual assaults, 10 kidnappings, and at least 62
other felonies.2
The reversal of false convictions is becoming more frequent.3
However, scholars have asserted that the exonerations that do
occur are probably a small fraction of actual wrongful convic-
tions. Gross and colleagues pointed out that “[o]ur legal system
places great weight on the finality of criminal convictions.
Courts and prosecutors are exceedingly reluctant to reverse
judgments or reconsider closed cases; when they do—and it’s
rare—it’s usually because of a compelling showing of error.”4
Therefore, in order for a wrongful conviction to be overturned,
these cases must undergo a lengthy appeals process. 
WRONGFUL CONVICTION CAUSAL FACTORS
To prevent wrongful convictions, it is important to under-
stand the factors that lead to them. In one study of 86 DNA-
exoneration cases, the leading factors contributing to wrongful
conviction were eyewitness misidentification (71% of the
cases), errors in forensic-science testing (63% of the cases),
police misconduct (44% of the cases), prosecutorial miscon-
duct (28% of the cases), false and misleading expert testimony
by forensic experts (27% of the cases), dishonest informants
and incompetent defense representation (both 19% of the
cases), and false confessions (17% of the cases).5 According to
a more recent analysis by The Innocence Project (2015), which
examined 325 post-conviction DNA exonerations in the
United States, the following errors were identified: eyewitness-
misidentification testimony (72% of cases), unvalidated or
improper forensic science (47% of cases), false
confessions/incriminating statements (27% of cases), and
informants or snitches (15% of cases).6 Based on these data, it
is apparent that there is an array of causal factors related to
wrongful convictions. 
Eyewitness misidentification. Wrongful-conviction
research has established that eyewitness identifications are
widely considered to be one of the least reliable forms of evi-
dence admitted in the courtroom.7 In one study of 500 cases of
erroneous convictions, the leading cause of mistaken convic-
tion was faulty eyewitness identification of defendants.8 Since
DNA testing became available in criminal cases in the 1990s,
hundreds of defendants who were convicted by United States
juries have been exonerated by exculpatory DNA evidence.9
Out of these people, 235 were cases of mistaken eyewitness
identification.10 Despite clear limitations, many legal decision
makers view eyewitness testimony as very persuasive. As eye-
witness testimony is the leading cause of wrongful convictions,
decision makers should consider the existing scientific knowl-
edge pertaining to the shortcomings of eyewitness testimony
when considering facts of criminal cases that involve eyewit-
nesses.11
Error in forensic-science testing. Forensic science (e.g.,
latent fingerprints and hair analysis) is often portrayed as a
gold standard of evidence since it is widely thought of as
unquestionable physical proof of one’s innocence or guilt.
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DNA evidence specifically has been referred to as a “truth
machine.”12 However, forensic-science error has led to wrong-
ful convictions in several cases. Whether it is laboratory fraud
or fabricated evidence, these erroneous methods are especially
troubling since scientific evidence is often the primary method
prosecutors use to prove a defendant’s guilt. In a study of the
trial transcripts of 137 exonerees, 13 cases involved either a
failure to disclose exculpatory data or analysis or fabrication of
forensic evidence.13
Police misconduct. In a study of 62 exonerations, police
misconduct was found in 50% of the cases.14 Common forms
of misconduct by police included employing suggestion when
conducting identification procedures, coercing false confes-
sions, lying or intentionally misleading jurors about their
observations, failing to turn over exculpatory evidence to pros-
ecutors, losing or destroying evidence, and providing incen-
tives to secure unreliable evidence from informants.15 Because
there is pressure on police officers to obtain incriminating evi-
dence against a suspect in the absence of alternate inculpatory
evidence, police may be “tempted to cut corners . . . perhaps to
manufacture evidence to clinch the case.”16
Expert Testimony. Experts may be held in a generally high
regard based on the witness’s credential or some other relevant
factor.17 In fact, because juries may give special weight to
forensic-science expert testimony,18 the U.S. Supreme Court
cautioned, “[e]xpert evidence can be both powerful and quite
misleading because of the difficulty in evaluating it.”19 A study
by Garrett and Neufeld found that in 60% of their sample of
wrongful-conviction cases, forensic analysts called by the pros-
ecution provided invalid testimony.20 Additionally, experts
sometimes testify regarding forensic-science practices (e.g.,
hair microscopy, bite-mark comparison) that, while practiced
for years, have not been subjected to adequate scientific
research.21 While forensic science often provides exonerating
information, the misuse of this evidence can have deleterious
implications as well. 
False confessions. Despite being implicated in 20% to
25% of wrongful convictions in DNA-exoneration cases in
the United States, confession evidence has been historically
regarded as a “gold standard” of evidence in court.22 How-
ever, of the 340 exonerations between 1989 and 2004, 51
defendants, or 15%, confessed to crimes they did not com-
mit.23 Most of these confessions were coerced by the police.
False confessions are heavily concentrated among the most
vulnerable populations—people with mental disabilities and
people under the age of 18. Of the false confessors in Gross
et al.’s study, 55% of them were either under 18, intellectually
disabled, or both.24 Research conducted by Kassin, Bogart,
and Kerner25 suggested that confessions may exert influence
in addition to the actual admission of guilt in trial. Specifi-
cally, incriminating confessions can mislead the perceptions
of lay witnesses, expert witnesses, and jurors. For example,
research has found that confessions influence verdicts even
when the confessor is reportedly mentally ill or when the
confessor was noted to be under duress when confessing.26
Furthermore, Kassin et al. found that multiple errors were
more likely to exist in wrongful-conviction cases containing
a confession.27 In such cases containing multiple errors, con-
fessions were more likely to have been obtained first rather
than later in the investigation. This temporal-order finding is
important because it suggests confessions taint other forms of
evidence. 
JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING
While judicial decision making is ostensibly guided by legal
factors, public policy and other influences often converge to
shape judicial decisions.28 Ideological factors as well as policy
preferences increasingly influence decision making as one
moves higher up the judicial “pyramid.”29 Although a growing
body of research has investigated the use of expert testimony
in jury decisions, little is known about how judges evaluate
scientific or psychological evidence in the decision-making
process.30 It has been indicated that some judges may be more
likely to disregard social-science evidence because it may repu-
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diate their (more conservative) sociopolitical beliefs.31 Fur-
thermore, research suggests that without additional training,
some judges may be less able to assess the validity of scientific
and psychological evidence accurately.32 This has several
implications for judges’ ability to interpret expert and eyewit-
ness testimony and be effective gatekeepers of forensic-science
and social-science evidence.  
For the most part, it is relatively unknown how judges per-
ceive the errors that commonly lead to convictions of innocent
defendants. In a survey conducted by Ramsey and Frank inves-
tigating criminal-justice professionals’ perceptions of the fre-
quency of wrongful convictions and system errors, judges indi-
cated beliefs that each system error occurred less frequently
than defense attorneys believed it occurred.33 Judge percep-
tions were more in line with police chiefs and prosecutors than
defense attorneys.34 In addition, survey responses indicated
criminal-justice professionals (i.e., defense counsel, police,
prosecutors, and judges) were least likely to acknowledge error
concerning corrupt actions, specifically police using false evi-
dence and prosecutors knowingly using false evidence. This
may reflect the fact that respondents are more likely to recog-
nize issues concerning negligence and poor training than
issues involving corruption within the system.35 While studies
such as this do ultimately shed some light on judges’ percep-
tions of factors leading to wrongful convictions, there is still
much to be learned regarding judicial decision making in
wrongful-conviction cases.   
THE PRESENT STUDY
Judicial decision making may be subject to the influence of
many different factors, including the judge’s attitudes, past
experiences, policy preferences, and opinion of scientific evi-
dence.36 The present study contributes to courtroom research
by examining demographics and perceptions of trial errors and
scientific evidence associated with the propensity to grant a
writ of habeas corpus.
We expected that judges would be more likely to grant the
writ of habeas corpus when confronted with errors in forensic-
science evidence contributing to a wrongful conviction over
errors in social-science evidence. This hypothesis is consistent
with past research documenting judicial and law-student par-
ticipants’ generally negative or dismissive attitudes about
social-science evidence.37 In an exploratory manner, we inves-
tigate which trial errors judges would place greatest impor-
tance on in their decision making. Finally, it was hypothesized
that judges’ attitudes toward different types of scientific evi-
dence (i.e., social science and forensic science) in the court-
room would influence granting of a new trial. 
METHOD
PARTICIPANTS
Participants were 308 judges with an average of approxi-
mately 13 years of experience each.38 The sample included 70
females (22.7% of the sample) and 238 males (77.3% of the
sample). Most judges reported being between the ages of 45
and 64 (75.4%), with others between 35 and 44 (7.1%), 65 and
74 (16.6%), and over 75 (1%). Most reported being Caucasian
(94.0%), while others reported being black or African-Ameri-
can (1.7%), Asian or Asian-American (1.7%), Hispanic or
Latin American (1.3%), or from another racial or ethnic back-
ground (3.3%). There was at least one participant from each
U.S. state, the District of Columbia, the Northern Mariana
Islands, and the Virgin Islands. The judicial sample comprised
judges from the following regions of jurisdiction: 32.1% of
judges presided in the West, 27.6% presided in the Midwest,
6.5% presided in the Northeast, 33.1% presided in the South,
and 0.6% presided in island territories. 
In the sample, 69.4% of judges served general jurisdictions,
while 5.5% served appellate, 22.8% served special,39 and 2.3%
served military jurisdictions. As a whole, judges estimated they
had presided over between 17 and 18 cases that had been
involved in the appeals process over the duration of their
careers thus far.40 The judges reported a range of experience
with cases over which they had presided that had been over-
turned on appeal, with an average of approximately five over-
turned cases.41
MEASURES 
Vignette. Judges were presented with one of two vignettes;
one included social-science evidence and the other, forensic-
science evidence. The vignettes contained three different evi-
dentiary issues related to the causal factors of wrongful con-
victions. All vignettes first presented system-corruption evi-
dence (i.e., held constant across conditions as a rationale to
raise the appeal process). There were then two variables from
one of the scientific-evidence categories (i.e., forensic or social
science). The vignettes’ presentation order of scientific eviden-
tiary issues were counterbalanced, with the system-corruption
issue always presented first and a counterbalanced variation of
the two scientific-evidence variables presented second and
third. Because post-conviction review is often focused on the
correction of legal and procedural errors, as opposed to factual
errors,42 judges were presented with the system-corruption
evidentiary issue (i.e., police misconduct) first, as it was poten-
tially more likely to be considered a legal error worthy of inves-
tigation that might then lead to judges’ further consideration of
additional factual errors (e.g., false confession, inaccurate
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expert testimony). The system-error evidence pertained to
causal factors of false convictions involving corrupt action by
form of police misconduct. The police-misconduct vignette
was as follows: 
Mr. Adam’s co-worker told the police that she was
with him on the night of the murder during the time that
the crime allegedly took place. However, law enforce-
ment officials never added this evidence to their police
report and it was never mentioned during trial, as it was
never turned over to the prosecutors. 
The evidentiary issues relating to social-science evidence
included evidence of a false confession and of an eyewitness
misidentification. These types of evidence fall under the
defined domain of social-science evidence in line with social-
psychological research on mechanisms and impacts involved
in false confessions and eyewitness misidentification.43 The
eyewitness-testimony vignette was as follows:
Mr. Williams testified at the original trial that he wit-
nessed what he believed to be Mr. Adams fleeing the
scene of the crime on the night of the murder. The eye-
witness stated that as he was leaving his friend’s house,
he heard a commotion in an alleyway and saw who
appeared to be Mr. Adams running and jumping over a
fence. When he heard about the murder on the news a
few days later, he went into the police station and told
them what he believes he saw. The underlying facts
regarding the identification procedure at the station
were never presented to the jury. First, at the time Mr.
Williams witnessed the perpetrator flee, it was late, dark,
and he had been drinking. He told the officers this and
they asked him to try his hardest to pick the perpetrator
from a lineup to the best of his ability, as they knew how
compelling an eyewitness would be to the jury during
the trial. When he stated he was unsure who the perpe-
trator was upon viewing the lineup, an officer asked if
he would take a few more minutes to consider who they
suspected committed the crime (Mr. Adams). The offi-
cers reminded him a few more times how important his
testimony would be to the case and reassured him that
they were already quite sure who had committed the
crime. Eventually, Mr. Williams picked out the suspect
from the lineup after recognizing that he had a similar
facial structure and facial hair to the man he witnessed
fleeing the scene of the crime. 
The false-confession vignette was as follows:
The prosecuting attorney presented evidence to the
court at the original trial that Mr. Adams confessed to
raping and murdering Mrs. Jones. The circumstances
behind the coerced confession included the following.
Mr. Adams was interrogated by police detectives for sev-
eral hours, after which they deployed deception to elicit
his confession. Specifically, they told him they had solid
incriminating evidence that he committed the crime in
the form of fingerprints on the murder weapon. How-
ever, this was untrue. At the arrival of his lawyer and
upon learning that there was no such fingerprint evi-
dence, Mr. Adams recanted the confession. The confes-
sion evidence played a large role in the prosecutor’s case
against Mr. Adams, and he was eventually convicted and
sentenced to 50 years to life in prison.
The evidentiary issues presented in the forensic-science
vignette were derived from real cases described by Garret and
Neufeld44 in their study examining trial transcripts for invalid
forensic-science testimony. The inaccurate-expert-testimony
vignette was as follows:
An expert from the local crime lab testified during the
trial regarding a serology analysis his lab conducted. In
this case, the victim, Mrs. Jones, and the suspect, Mr.
Adams, are both B secretors. B substances were found on
the victim’s underwear, which could have been entirely
from the victim. However, the analyst testified stating
that the donor would have had to have been a B secretor.
In addition, A antigens were found on another stain in
the victim’s underwear that were foreign to both the sus-
pect and the victim, but the analyst failed to exclude Mr.
Adams as the source stating to the court that the foreign
substance could be a mixture of blood, sweat, wood,
leather, and detergents or other substances, indicating
that the suspect should not be ruled out based on this
evidence. 
The faulty-laboratory-procedure vignette was as follows:
A private forensic laboratory’s analyst reportedly
failed to detect semen on the victim’s underwear so that
no testing could be done to either include or exclude Mr.
Adams. However, a post-conviction on-the-spot DNA
test later showed a positive result for the presence of
semen on that exact spot that should not have been
missed previously. Subsequent DNA testing on the spot
will provide evidence lending to the innocence of the
suspect. 
Vignette-related factors and outcomes. Judges answered
questions after each evidentiary issue was presented. After the
first piece of evidence (i.e., system error/police misconduct)
was presented, the judges were asked to consider the piece of
evidence and rate how likely they would be to grant a new trial
on a scale of 1 to 10. Following the presentation of the entire
vignette (i.e., either all forensic or all social-science evidence),
judges made final decisions as to the likelihood of granting a
new trial (using the scalar item), as well as whether or not they
would grant a writ of habeas corpus in dichotomous format.
Therefore, the items included a dichotomous “yes”/“no” ques-
tion addressing this decision (used for ecological-validity pur-
poses) and a continuous version of the question asking, “How
likely are you to grant the writ on a scale of 1 to 10?” 
An opinion portion of the questionnaire followed the deci-
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note 25; Steven Penrod, Eyewitness Identification Evidence: How Well
Are Witnesses and Police Performing? 54 CRIM. JUST. MAG. 36 (2005).
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Social Scientists as Amici Curiae, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 25
(1990); Donald N. Bersoff & David W. Ogden, In the Supreme
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for the American Psychological Association, 42 AM. PSYCHOL. 59
(1987); INNOCENCE PROJECT, supra note 15; Ronald G. Roesch,
Stephen L. Golding, Valerie P. Hans & N. Dickon Reppucci, Social
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sion, where the judges were asked to rate how important each
evidence variable was in their decision-making process. They
rated the importance of each trial error on a scalar rating, with
1 being “Not at all” and 10 being “Very much so.” Participat-
ing judges also indicated which evidentiary issue presented in
the vignette was most influential in their decision regarding
whether to grant a new trial, as well as which evidentiary issue
was least influential. 
Scientific Evidence in Court Attitudes Questionnaire.
After the decision-making portion of the survey was complete,
judges responded to 36 items related to beliefs and attitudes
about scientific evidence. Eighteen items pertained to social
science in a courtroom context, and the remaining 18 items
concerned forensic science in the courtroom. For example, a
social-science item stated, “The subjectivity of social science
causes me to question its value in the courtroom.” A forensic-
science item stated, “Forensic science expert witnesses have
been known to exaggerate their findings to benefit the side for
whom they are testifying.” The items were derived from issues
discussed in a variety of sources, including amicus briefs,
research articles, court cases, and The Innocence Project.45
Judges were asked to rate the extent to which they agreed with
the 36 items. They responded on a 10-point scale, with 1 being
“Not at all” and 10 being “Very much so.”
PROCEDURE
Questionnaires were distributed to judges through Survey-
Monkey, a survey-hosting website. Participating judges were
contacted through a National Judicial College electronic mail-
ing list. Before answering items on the questionnaire, a brief
consent form explained the rights and risks of the participants
that are involved in the research study. If consenting, the par-
ticipants were directed to the remainder of the questionnaire.
The versions of the vignettes (i.e., social science or forensic sci-
ence) presented to the participants were randomly assigned
through a logic function in SurveyMonkey. Of the participating
judges, 48.7% received the social-science vignette, and 51.3%
received the forensic-science vignette.  
FINDINGS
PRELIMINARY ANALYSES
A total of 279 out of 308 judges (90.5%) ultimately granted
the writ of habeas corpus. Of the judges in the forensic-science
condition, 92.4% ultimately granted the writ of habeas corpus.
In the social-science condition, 88.7% of the judges ultimately
granted the writ of habeas corpus. Other than gender, no
demographic variables showed significant effects on ultimate
decisions regarding granting a writ of habeas corpus.46 Results
indicated that gender of the judge was fairly influential on
judges’ decisions regarding how likely they were to grant the
writ.47 Specifically, females48 reported a somewhat higher like-
lihood of granting the writ than males.49 Similarly, the ultimate
dichotomous decision regarding whether to grant the writ dif-
fered by gender,50 where females more often indicated they
would grant the writ of habeas corpus (97.1%) in comparison
to males (88.7%). 
DOES THE TYPE OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE PRE-
SENTED IN THE VIGNETTE CONTRIBUTE TO THE
JUDGES’ DECISIONS REGARDING GRANTING A WRIT
OF HABEAS CORPUS?
We conducted a logistic regression to evaluate what type of
evidence would most influence the decision to grant the writ
of habeas corpus. A logistic regression allows the prediction of
categorical outcomes (i.e., yes or no) with two or more cate-
gories. Therefore, a logistic regression was utilized to deter-
mine the influence of the different types of evidence presented
to judges on their ultimate decision to grant the writ (i.e., yes
or no). This model also included gender to evaluate its role on
decisions to grant a writ. While the overall group of predictors
was significant,51 only gender influenced the decision to grant
the writ in this instance.52
Results of the current study collectively suggest that female
judges were consistently more likely to grant the writ than
male judges, even when couched in the context of restricted
ranges of overall sample responses. Of note, existing research
on judges and gender found sentencing disparities involving
the gender of the defendant.53 Specifically, it was found that
female offenders receive more lenient sentences by male judges
and that male offenders are punished more harshly regardless
of the gender of the judge.54 Adding to the literature on gen-
der-difference theories in a judicial context, gender differences
in judicial decision making have been found in sex-discrimi-
nation cases. Specifically, it was found that male and female
judges utilize distinct approaches in these types of cases, with
the probability of female judges ruling in favor of the plaintiff
10% more often than when the judge is male.55 Additionally,
research findings indicated that the presence of a female judge
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on a panel of judges increases the likelihood of a male judge
ruling in favor of the plaintiff by 12% to 14%.56 In other words,
“the presence of a female on a panel actually causes male
judges to vote in a way they otherwise would not.”57 A plausi-
ble explanation for gender differences in granting the writ may
be found in research on the construct of authoritarianism.
Some studies have found that males tend to be higher in
authoritarianism than women.58 Research has suggested that
individuals higher in authoritarianism may assign harsh pun-
ishment, be tougher on offenders, and be more likely to rec-
ommend conviction.59 Therefore, perhaps male judges, who
may be more likely to be high in authoritarianism, are less
likely to consider the possibility of potentially releasing a pre-
viously convicted offender, even when confronted with per-
suasive proof of error. This finding demonstrates an area for
further research to better understand potential gender differ-
ences among judges.
We conducted an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) to
examine the relationship between the likelihood of granting a
writ of habeas corpus depending on vignette condition, con-
trolling for gender. The overall model displayed a significant
effect on likelihood of granting the writ.60 Both type of evi-
dence61 and gender62 contributed to judges’ decisions regard-
ing how likely they were to grant the writ. Results indicated
participants in the forensic-science condition63 were more
likely to grant the writ (i.e., assign higher likelihood ratings)
than those in the social-science condition.64
When asked what evidence presented in court is generally
more influential on their decision-making process, 0.6% of
judges indicated psychological evidence such as eyewitness
misidentifications and false confessions; 61.4% indicated
forensic-science evidence such as serology, fingerprints, and
DNA evidence; and 38% reported that they do not think one
type of evidence is more influential than the other. Further,
when asked which type of expert testimony they generally
found more credible, 0.6% of judges indicated social-science
testimony, 76% indicated forensic-science testimony, and
23.4% reported that they do not find one generally more cred-
ible than the other. Figure 1 demonstrates these preferences. 
Judges indicated which evidentiary issues were most and
least influential to their decision regarding granting the writ of
habeas corpus. Table 1 provides a breakdown of their
responses for both the forensic-science- and social-science-
vignette conditions. 
Judicial consideration of police misconduct (i.e., the first
piece of evidence presented to the judges) is of particular
importance to the wrongful-conviction literature.65 Of all evi-
dentiary issues presented, police misconduct accounted for the
greatest amount of variance in granting the writ across vignette
conditions, suggesting judges place considerably high empha-
sis on criminal-justice-system errors. 
Among the judges in the forensic-science condition, the
likelihood of granting the writ of habeas corpus depended on
the importance ratings that judges associated with the three
different evidentiary issues: police misconduct, faulty labora-
tory procedure, and inaccurate expert testimony. With regard
to a mistake made in a forensic laboratory, the results sug-
gested that once the judges were presented with evidence of
faulty laboratory procedure, the more they valued that evi-
dence, the more likely they were to grant the writ of habeas
corpus. This finding indicates that the importance associated
with this type of error played a significant role in the judicial
decision-making process. Seeing an error made in a forensic-
science laboratory may have served as an eye-opening
reminder to judges that forensic science is not always unques-
tionable physical proof of guilt or innocence. Therefore, many
judges seemed to consider a mistake made with this generally
accepted and trustworthy evidence to be an important factor in
the appeals process. 
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TABLE 1
INFLUENTIAL EVIDENTIARY ISSUES FOR FORENSIC-SCIENCE
AND SOCIAL-SCIENCE CONDITIONS
FORENSIC-SCIENCE
CONDITION
Police 
Misconduct
Faulty Laboratory
Procedure
Inaccurate Expert
Testimony
Most Influential 49.4% 37.3% 13.3%
Least Influential 28.5% 18.4% 53.2%
SOCIAL-SCIENCE
CONDITION
Police 
Misconduct
Faulty Laboratory
Procedure
Inaccurate Expert
Testimony
Most Influential 69.3% 25.3% 5.3%
Least Influential 11.3% 26.7% 62.0%
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74. (range .44 to .74, eigenvalue = 3.62)
75. (loadings range = .37 to .66; eigenvalue = 2.29)
76. alpha = .77
77. alpha = .63
78. (KMO = 0.90)
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In the social-science condition, the judges’ likelihood of
granting the writ depended on the importance ratings of two
different trial errors: eyewitness misidentification and police
misconduct. The perceived importance of a false confession
did not impact judges’ likelihood to grant the writ of habeas
corpus. In fact, 62% of the judges named the false-confession
evidence as the least influential evidentiary error presented to
them. This finding is consistent with mock-jury research that
has found that even when people decide that a confession was
coerced or involuntary,66 or when they say the confession evi-
dence does not influence their decisions,67 individuals do not
appropriately discount confession evidence. Therefore, per-
haps some judges simply are less likely to acknowledge that
false confessions occur or are problematic in the first place.   
The importance of eyewitness identification was the only
social-science evidentiary issue that affected judges’ likelihood
of granting a new trial. It appears judges place a value on such
evidence that is in line with the high frequency with which
eyewitness misidentifications have occurred in actual exonera-
tion cases.68 Judges may be more likely to perceive eyewitness
misidentification as an important and influential trial error due
to judges’ responsibility for preventing and minimizing effects
of eyewitness errors in the United States court system.69 Specif-
ically, the quintessential responsibility judges hold in facilitat-
ing the prevention and identification of erroneous eyewitness
testimony70 may lend itself to explain why judges’ perceived
importance regarding eyewitness error successfully predicted
the likelihood to grant a writ of habeas corpus.
DO ATTITUDES PERTAINING TO SCIENTIFIC EVI-
DENCE, SPECIFICALLY EITHER SOCIAL SCIENCE OR
FORENSIC SCIENCE, INFLUENCE JUDICIAL DECISION
MAKING REGARDING GRANTING A WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS? 
To develop items for the forensic-science-attitudes scales,
an exploratory-factor-analysis (EFA) procedure was performed
to retain only factors that are maximally representative of
judges’ attitudes pertaining to scientific evidence.71 After sev-
eral analyses were run, which produced suboptimal results due
to issues with some of the items and the model, a forced two-
factor EFA model utilizing all but two of the items from the
Attitudes Regarding Forensic Scientific Evidence Scale (due to
a general lack of fit with the other items) was run, which sug-
gested meaningful72 and correlated73 relationships among fac-
tors. Nine of the 16 remaining items were related to factor 1,74
and six items were related to a second factor.75 Item 3 was
dropped due to lack of conceptual fit on either factor.
From these results, it can be concluded that two underlying
sub-components exist, namely, Negative Attitudes Regarding
Forensic-Science Evidence (factor 1)76 and Positive Attitudes
Regarding Forensic-Science Evidence (factor 2).77 Factor 1
comprises items suggesting beliefs that forensic-science evi-
dence is flawed, biased, or lacks validity and reliability. Sample
items include “Forensic science can produce errors that con-
tribute to wrongful convictions” and “Forensic science tech-
niques lack adequate reliability and validity.” Conversely, fac-
tor 2 includes items that refer to beliefs about the infallibility
of forensic-science evidence. Items correspond with beliefs
that forensic-science evidence is objective, not likely to be
biased by experts, and rarely inadmissible in court. Sample
items include “Forensic science is the most important evidence
presented during a criminal court proceeding” and “Opposing
experts are less likely to disagree about forensic science evi-
dence in court.” 
An EFA procedure was performed including the scores of
the items in the Attitudes Regarding Social Scientific Evidence
Scale. The EFA results, including all 18 items of the Attitudes
Regarding Social Scientific Evidence Scale, suggested meaning-
ful78 and correlated79 relationships among factors. Results of
the EFA suggested one factor. Four items (7, 9, 10, and 14)
were removed due to insufficient factor loading, yielding a 14-
item, single-factor model.80
From these results, it was concluded that one underlying
sub-component exists, namely, Negative Attitudes Regarding
Social Science Evidence (factor 1).81 This scale comprises
items suggesting that social-science evidence is biased, is not
applicable to the real world, and should be inadmissible in
court. Sample items include “Social science evidence is easily
manipulated to favor either side in a trial” and “Most fact find-
ers have difficulties assessing the quality of social science evi-
dence.” 
Repeated-measures General Linear Modeling was used to
test the combined effects of judges’ ratings before and after
being presented with all pieces of evidence, judges’ gender, and
their attitudes regarding scientific evidence. This type of analy-
sis allowed the investigators in the study to compare variables’
impacts on the outcome (i.e., likelihood to grant the writ) both
before and after certain evidentiary issues were introduced,
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while comparing results by different group variables, such as
gender and vignette condition (i.e., social science vs. forensic
science). Within the forensic-science-vignette subsample, no
significant effects were observed. Within the social-science-
vignette subsample, the main effect of the pre-post writ rating
remained significant.82 Participants were significantly more
likely to grant the writ after considering all scientific errors83
than after viewing police corruption only.84 No additional sig-
nificant effects were observed. 
Data from several analyses suggest a pattern of judges pre-
ferring forensic science over social science. Therefore, it seems
possible that judges value forensic-science evidence (even
errors pertaining to forensic-science evidence) more than they
value social-science evidence. These findings are consistent
with previous literature that has explored why courts seem to
ignore relevant social-science research85 or reject social-science
evidence.86 The current study builds upon Redding and Rep-
pucci’s findings where many judges indicated a distrust of
social science, particularly experts who testify in court regard-
ing social science.87
EXPLORATORY ANALYSES
The Attitudes Regarding Scientific Evidence scales were
tested for their direct impact on the dichotomous judicial deci-
sion regarding granting a writ of habeas corpus. Logistic
regression was employed for examination of both Attitudes
Regarding Forensic and Social Scientific Evidence, predicting
the ultimate dichotomous writ decision when controlling for
participant gender and vignette condition. 
The set of predictors displayed a significant effect on the
dichotomous writ decision;88 the model also displayed ade-
quate fit.89 Of the Attitudes Regarding Scientific Evidence sub-
scales, only Positive Attitudes Regarding Forensic-Science Evi-
dence90 and Negative Attitudes Regarding Social-Science Evi-
dence91 showed significant effects. The odds ratio suggests that
as positive attitudes regarding forensic-science evidence
increase, the odds of the judges granting the writ of habeas cor-
pus increase as well. In addition, as negative attitudes regard-
ing social-science evidence increase, the odds of the judges
granting the writ of habeas corpus decrease. 
Supplemental logistic-regression analyses were conducted
to evaluate whether the effects of Attitudes Regarding Scien-
tific Evidence scores on the dichotomous writ decision varied
by vignette subsample. Identical regression parameters were
retained from the previous analysis. For judges in the foren-
sic-science-vignette condition, the set of predictors displayed
a significant effect on whether or not they ultimately granted
the writ of habeas corpus;92 the model also displayed ade-
quate fit.93 Similar to the findings from the larger overall sam-
ple, only Positive Attitudes Regarding Forensic Science94 and
Negative Attitudes Regarding Social Science95 displayed sig-
nificant effects. Odds ratios indicated that as positive atti-
tudes regarding forensic-science evidence increase, so do
odds of judges granting the writ of habeas corpus. Further, as
negative attitudes regarding social science increase, judges’
odds of granting the writ decrease. For judges in the social-
science-vignette condition, the set of predictors did not dis-
play a significant effect on whether or not they ultimately
granted the writ of habeas corpus;96 the model also displayed
adequate fit.97
Consistent with Redding and Reppucci’s finding that
judges’ general attitudes about the use of social science in law
correlate with specific judgments,98 results of the current
study suggest that judges’ attitudes toward scientific evidence
predicted whether judges would ultimately grant the writ of
habeas corpus using the dichotomous-outcome variable (i.e.,
yes or no). This finding is particularly relevant to judicial
decision making, as the judges’ dichotomous decision is exter-
nally valid and more applicable to the kinds of decisions
judges typically make in court. The results indicate that the
more positive attitudes regarding forensic science and the less
negative attitudes regarding social science, the more likely
judges were to grant the writ. This could point to potential
biasing factors regarding how judicial decision makers feel
about science. Furthermore, when broken down by subsam-
ple, only judges who received the forensic-science vignette
were significantly affected by their attitudes when making the
dichotomous decision. 
Because these results suggest judges are less likely to change
their attitudes, it seems system reform is a viable option to rec-
tify errors involving scientific evidence. According to Haney, lit-
tle widespread and lasting legal change results from psychologi-
cal testimony regarding these errors.99 Instead, Haney advises
working toward concrete changes within the legal system by
seeking improvements to mandatory jury instruction or changes
to the rules of evidence.100 The Innocence Project, in conjunc-
tion with the National Academy of Sciences, recommends the
creation of an independent federal entity that would seek to con-
duct comprehensive research and evaluation within the forensic
sciences to establish validated standards and consistent applica-
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tions of forensic techniques nationwide.101 Widely enforced sci-
entific standards, in combination with judicial training regard-
ing complex scientific evidence, could significantly assist judges
in making important legal decisions within the justice system.
Ultimately, if the frequency of these errors is reduced, not only
would the number of wrongful convictions eventually decrease,
but the justice system’s time and financial resources would be
saved as well, as fewer efforts would be wasted in rectifying these
errors in the first place. 
CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS
Overall, results indicated the following factors played a part
in judges’ decisions regarding granting a writ of habeas corpus:
gender of the judge, forensic- versus social-science-vignette
condition, and the perceived importance of certain evidentiary
issues (i.e., faulty laboratory procedure, police misconduct,
inaccurate expert testimony, and eyewitness misidentification).
Additionally, attitudes regarding social and forensic scientific
evidence differentially predicted the decision of whether judges
would ultimately grant the writ of habeas corpus.
IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY AND TRAINING
Present findings point to the need for greater awareness
among criminal-justice professionals regarding the many dif-
ferent types of procedural or evidentiary errors existent in
wrongful-conviction cases. In light of present findings and pre-
vious research, training for judges may include information
regarding frequency and potential consequences of common
procedural and evidentiary errors, the scientific method and
how it relates to the types of evidence potentially presented in
court, validity and reliability of scientific analyses and tech-
niques often presented in the courtroom, and management of
threats to objectivity.
The particular importance of judge education is high-
lighted, specifically regarding how often some of these trial
errors occur in actuality, because it may be the case that some
judges are underestimating the prevalence of such errors and,
as a result, are overlooking their possible contribution to
wrongful convictions. For example, many judges seemed to
disregard evidence of a false confession in the current study,
and yet in 27% of actual DNA exonerations, innocent defen-
dants made incriminating statements, pled guilty, or falsely
confessed.102 Furthermore, to reduce the prevalence of wrong-
ful convictions in the first place, the results of the current
study support the continuation of scientific-evidence training
among judges. Fong, Krantz, and Nisbett found that individ-
uals who underwent brief training in methodological reason-
ing provided more scientifically sophisticated solutions to a
series of real-world problems.103 Therefore, judges may be
able to reason in an increasingly methodologically sophisti-
cated manner after brief training, and as a result, they may
also be better “able to scrutinize the quality of expert evidence
more systematically and thus make better informed deci-
sions.”104
For several decades, judges have been receiving training on
scientific methods through judicial-education conferences and
seminars, as well as through entities like the National Judicial
College, the Federal Judicial Center, and the Agency for Sci-
ence, Technology, and Research. Nevertheless, although educa-
tion has been available, it generally has not been treated as a
core component of judges’ curricula. Future training, available
to judges in all levels of courts and jurisdictions through work-
shops and webinars, should focus on how social and forensic
scientific evidence can inform judicial decisions. 
Due to the often-complicated nature of scientific evidence
in the courtroom, it is of vital importance that judges under-
stand the complexities of the evidence to perform the gate-
keeping aspect of their jobs responsibly.105 Regrettably, judges
might sometimes find themselves in a position to evaluate
rather convoluted materials without specialized training or
expertise on the subject. Therefore, in addition to scientific-
methodology training, judges should be informed as to the
reliability, validity, and conformance to Daubert principles of
different social-science measures as well as forensic-science
techniques.106 They should be aware of which techniques have
not been subjected to rigorous scientific evaluation (i.e., hair
microscopy, bite-mark comparisons, tool-mark analysis), so
that they can make well-informed gatekeeping decisions.
Accordingly, a National Institute of Justice research report pro-
duced by representatives from practice, academia, and other
relevant areas suggested the following potentially needed areas
of judicial education: “the basics of a given science . . . regula-
tions for expert presentations, and resources for determining
when science is conclusive.”107
While understanding the science presented in court is of
utmost importance, it is possible that judges would benefit
from objectivity training as well. As pointed out by Smith and
Blumberg, “The judge . . . can only strive to minimize the emo-
tional, the idiosyncratic elements in his intellectual processes,
but cannot eliminate them altogether.”108 Therefore, consider-
ing our results suggesting that judicial decision making could
potentially be compromised by preferences and opinions
regarding scientific evidence, training should also address
plausible techniques in detecting and managing threats to
objectivity. While biases and opinions cannot be removed
entirely, they can be adjusted for as long as they are identified
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and acknowledged.109 Future training opportunities should
address ways judges can practice such self-scrutiny.
Previous research on minimizing the influence of biases
among expert witnesses has suggested employing a set of
introspective tasks as an approach to proactively detect and
prevent unconscious biases.110 Drawing on those suggestions,
similar tasks could be presented to judges as a method of rec-
ognizing threats to objectivity that may have previously been
difficult to recognize. Some of these tasks would include a list
of questions judges should ask themselves when evaluating
scientific evidence in court. For example, they could ask them-
selves if they are having difficulty assessing the quality of the
evidence, if the evidence presented resonates with preexisting
ideas or attitudes regarding a particular type of science, or if
their personal training and experience is adequate for the case. 
Limitations. There are a few limitations associated with the
current study. As with most studies that employ vignettes, the
ecological validity associated with this particular method of
data collection is limited. A short vignette is likely vague in
comparison to actual in-court testimony or more detailed dis-
coverable evidence. In regard to sample limitations, the North-
east region of the United States was underrepresented in com-
parison to other regions. Further, some judges with more
unique demographic information (e.g., jurisdiction, years
served, region) may have been reluctant to participate in the
study for fear of identifying information that could be some-
how connected to opinions and attitudes collected in the sur-
vey. All findings must be viewed cautiously in light of the
restricted range of ultimate decisional outcomes. 
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